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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review from 
the Board of Immigration Appeals  
(Agency No.: A079-864-650) 
Immigration Judge: Virna A. Wright 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 12, 2021 
 
Before: CHAGARES, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 








SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 Hernandez Tokpah petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s 
order dismissing his appeal and affirming the Immigration Judge’s determination that he 
is removable as an aggravated felon. In making its decision, the Board relied on Matter of 
Rosa, 27 I. & N. Dec. 228 (BIA 2018). We have since reversed that decision and clarified 
the proper framework for determining whether a state conviction qualifies as an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). See Rosa v. Att’y Gen., 950 F.3d 67, 81 
(3d Cir. 2020). We will grant Tokpah’s petition for review, vacate the Board’s dismissal, 
and remand so that the Board can conduct further proceedings consistent with Rosa. 
I 
Tokpah is a native and citizen of Liberia. He was admitted to the United States in 
2004 as a refugee and in 2008 obtained lawful permanent resident status. 
In 2017, following a guilty plea in New Jersey Superior Court, Tokpah was 
convicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine within 1,000 feet of school 
property in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-7(a) (the “New Jersey School Zone 
Statute”). He was sentenced to two years of probation. 
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) commenced removal proceedings 
against Tokpah. Based on his conviction under the New Jersey School Zone Statute, he 
was charged with removability under both 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), due to his 
conviction for a controlled substance offense, and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for 
having been convicted of an aggravated felony after admission to the United States. 
Tokpah conceded his removability on the controlled substance conviction but denied that 
he was removable as an aggravated felon. 
3 
Tokpah applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which 
requires, inter alia, that the applicant “has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.” 
An Immigration Judge rendered a written decision finding that Tokpah was not 
removable as an aggravated felon. Thus, Tokpah remained eligible for cancellation of 
removal.1 
DHS, however, filed a motion to reconsider in light of Matter of Rosa, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 228 (BIA 2018), an intervening Board decision determining that a conviction under 
the New Jersey School Zone Statute is an aggravated felony. In Matter of Rosa, the 
Board reasoned that it was permissible to look to multiple provisions of the Controlled 
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq., in determining whether a state offense 
constitutes an aggravated felony. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 231–32. Under this approach, the 
Board compared the New Jersey School Zone Statute to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which 
proscribes possession with intent to distribute cocaine. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 232. Because 
the New Jersey School Zone Statute necessarily involves possession with intent to 
distribute, the Board determined that it qualified as an aggravated felony. Id. at 233–34.  
At a subsequent hearing, an Immigration Judge reconsidered the prior decision—
that Tokpah had not been convicted of an aggravated felony—and, applying Matter of 
Rosa, held that Tokpah had been convicted of an aggravated felony. In light of this new 
ruling, Tokpah was no longer eligible for cancellation of removal.2 Tokpah filed a timely 
 
1  Tokpah also remained eligible for asylum and withholding of removal. 
2  The decision that Tokpah was removable as an aggravated felon also rendered him 
ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A), 
1231(b)(3)(B). As a result, Tokpah’s only potential avenue for protection against removal 
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administrative appeal of the Immigration Judge’s decision. The Board, relying on Matter 
of Rosa, dismissed Tokpah’s appeal. Tokpah timely filed a petition for review 
challenging the Board’s decision. His case was then held in abeyance pending our review 
of the Board’s decision in Matter of Rosa. On January 29, 2020, we issued our opinion in 
Rosa, 950 F.3d at 81, overturning the Board’s decision in Matter of Rosa. 
II3 
In Rosa, we applied the categorical approach4 to determine whether the 
defendant’s conviction under the New Jersey School Zone Statute amounted to an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). 950 F.3d at 73–76. We held that when 
making the aggravated felony determination, adjudicators must compare the state statute 
of conviction “to only [its] most similar federal analog.” Id. at 76. Further, we held that 
the New Jersey School Zone Statute’s most similar federal analog is 21 U.S.C. § 860 (the 
“Federal School Zone Statute”). Id. at 80. 
 
was the Convention Against Torture, but the Immigration Judge found Tokpah failed to 
show the requisite likelihood of torture to qualify for deferral of removal. 
3  The Board had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), and we have 
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Our jurisdiction to review an order of removal 
based on the commission of an aggravated felony is limited, under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D), to “constitutional claims or questions of law.” Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 
528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc). We review questions of law and 
constitutional issues de novo. Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017). 
4  Courts use the “categorical approach” to determine whether prior criminal 
convictions trigger certain consequences under federal law. See e.g., Taylor v. United 
States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–602 (1990). Under this approach, courts look “only to the 
statutory definitions of the prior offenses” and “consider neither the particular facts 
underlying the prior convictions nor the label a State assigns to the crimes.” Shular v. 
United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 783 (2020) (cleaned up) (citations omitted). 
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In Tokpah’s case, the Board affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision comparing 
the New Jersey School Zone Statute to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),5 not the Federal School 
Zone Statute. Under Rosa, the Board erred. Accordingly, the Government can only 
prevail in this case if intervening law has vitiated our holding in Rosa. The Government 
contends the Supreme Court’s decision in Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020), 
does exactly that. We disagree.  
In Shular, the Supreme Court explained that “statutes calling for a categorical 
approach ask the court to determine” either (1) “whether the prior conviction was for a 
certain offense,” or (2) “whether the conviction meets some other criterion.” Id. at 783. 
The Court held that when the statute falls within the “some other criterion” category, 
courts need not compare the state conviction to a federal offense. Id. at 787. 
The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) provision at issue in Shular called for 
a categorical approach to determine whether the defendant’s six prior cocaine-related 
convictions under Florida law constituted predicate “serious drug offenses.” Id. at 782–
83. The ACCA defines “serious drug offense” by reference to prohibited conduct—for 
example, any state offense involving the conduct of manufacturing a controlled substance 
constitutes a “serious drug offense.”6 Id. at 782. The Court reasoned that statutes 
describing prohibited conduct, as opposed to referencing specific offenses, are statutes 
that ask courts to determine “whether the conviction meets some other criterion.” Id. at 
 
5  21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) proscribes possession with intent to distribute cocaine. 
6  In relevant part, the ACCA defines “serious drug offense” as “an offense under 
State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture 
or distribute, a controlled substance . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). 
6 
783, 787. And because the relevant provision of the ACCA fell within the “some other 
criterion” category, there was no need to compare the defendant’s state conviction with 
any federal offense. See id. at 787. 
Conversely, the statute in Rosa does not fall within the “some other criterion” 
category but asks courts to determine whether the state conviction was for a certain 
offense. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provision at issue in Rosa defined 
an “aggravated felony” as “a drug trafficking crime (as defined in [18 U.S.C 
§ 924(c)(2)]).” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). As relevant here, a “drug trafficking crime” is 
“any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act.” 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(2). This 
INA provision asks courts to determine whether the prior state conviction matches a 
certain federal offense—namely an offense punishable as a felony under the Controlled 
Substances Act. Because Shular does not affect our precedent regarding how to apply the 
categorical approach to statutes that ask for a comparison between a defendant’s prior 
conviction and certain federal offenses, Rosa remains binding precedent.7 
The Board’s failure to use the approach detailed in Rosa constitutes error.   
 
7  We note that after the Shular opinion was issued, the Government petitioned for 
rehearing in the Rosa case. In support of its petition, the Government raised the same 
argument it raises here, i.e., that Shular vitiates our holding in Rosa. We denied the 
Government’s petition. 
Moreover, we note that since Shular was decided, several of our sister circuits 
have issued opinions determining whether a petitioner’s state conviction qualified as an 
aggravated felony under the INA. None of these opinions cite Shular, let alone hold that 
it changes how courts apply the categorical approach in the aggravated felony context. 
See, e.g., Dominguez v. Barr, 975 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2020); Soto-Vittini v. Barr, 973 
F.3d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 2020); Gordon v. Att’y Gen., 962 F.3d 1344, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 
2020); Cucalon v. Barr, 958 F.3d 245, 250 (4th Cir. 2020). 
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III 
 For the reasons provided, we will grant Tokpah’s petition for review, vacate the 
decision of the Board, and remand so the Board may conduct further proceedings 
consistent with Rosa. 
